With panel estimates, this paper investigates the neoclassical determinants of income per capita growth for 51 African countries for 1970-2007, while accounting for cross-sectional (spatial) dependence and conflict (i.e., terrorism, internal conflicts, and external wars). For the entire sample, fixed-effects panel estimates find that transnational terrorism has a significant, but modest, marginal impact on income per capita growth. These results hold for two different terrorism event data sets. However, domestic terrorist events do not affect income per capita growth. This suggests that an earlier growth study, which did not include domestic terrorist events for a different sample and time period, provided an accurate picture for Africa. The paper contains a host of robustness checks that find virtually identical results. Alternative terrorist variables are also used, with little qualitative change in the findings. The absence of a domestic terrorism impact is surprising because there were generally many more domestic than transnational terrorist incidents in Africa. To promote growth, host and donor countries must direct scarce counterterrorism resources to protect against transnational terrorism in particular.
Introduction
In their bid to force governments to concede to their demands, terrorists plan attacks that have adverse consequences on targeted countries' economies. Thus, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) targeted tourist sites and commerce centers in Spain, while Jemaah Islamiyah bombed a popular nightclub in Bali and a tourist hotel in Jakarta. Modern-day terrorists have damaged infrastructure -e.g., train stations, bus stations, airports, and stock exchanges -not only to create anxiety in a targeted audience, but also to disrupt the economy. Terrorists hope that economic costs when combined with human losses from economic-damaging attacks will pressure besieged governments to concede to their political demands. In Africa, terrorist groups have also sought out economic targets -e.g., the Islamic Group staged the Luxor massacre of tourists on 17 November 1997 at Hatshepsut's Temple in Egypt. This armed attack murdered 62 and injured 24 (Mickolus & Simmons, 2002) . The car bombing of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya on 28 November 2002 by an al-Qaida affiliated Somali group killed 16 (including 3 suicide terrorists) and injured 80 (Mickolus & Simmons, 2006) . Two surface-to-airmissiles on this same day narrowly missed hitting an Israeli-chartered airline taking off from Mombasa airport.
Terrorism can negatively influence a targeted country's economic growth through a number of channels. 1 First, terrorist attacks may enhance uncertainty which limits investments and diverts foreign direct investment to safer venues, as documented by a number of studies (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Enders, Sachsida & Sandler, 2006; Enders & Sandler, 1996) .
Second, augmented security outlays by a targeted government may crowd out productive public and private investment (Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides, 2004; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008 , 2009 ). Third, a terrorist campaign raises the costs of doing business through higher wages, larger insurance premiums, and greater security expenditures, which, in turn, decrease profits, productivity, and growth. Fourth, terrorist attacks may dampen growth by destroying or degrading social overhead capital that facilitates commerce and daily routines. Disruption to transportation, communication, and electricity infrastructure may have short-term dire economic consequences. Fifth, terrorism impacts specific industries -e.g., airlines and tourism (Drakos, 2004; Drakos & Kutan, 2003; Enders, Sandler & Parise, 1992; Ito & Lee, 2005) -which, in turn, may limit growth. This may be especially true when terrorists target export-sector assets in an export-led-growth economy. If such attacks on, say, a country's mineral wealth make export of resources unreliable, then importing countries will turn to more reliable sources of supply when available. Sixth, terrorism may cause donor countries to curtail foreign assistance owing to stability concerns. On a smaller scale, terrorism adversely affects economic growth for many of the same reasons -e.g., capital flight, increased uncertainty, destroyed infrastructure, and increased security spending -that internal conflicts or civil wars impede economic growth.
The primary purpose of this paper is to present panel estimates of the neoclassical determinants of income per capita growth for 51 African countries for 1970-2007, while accounting for cross-sectional (spatial) dependence and conflict (i.e., terrorism, internal conflicts, and external wars). We are particularly interested in the impact of terrorism on growth, because other studies focused on the impact of internal wars on growth (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Murdoch & Sandler, 2002a (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008 , 2009 . When examining the underlying determinants of growth, Artadi & Sala-i-Martin (2003) showed that these determinants differ greatly for Africa compared to the rest of the world. In particular, Africa suffers from low openness, low primary school enrollment, high public spending as a share of GDP, high population growth, and low investment as a share of GDP. These factors may make African growth particularly prone to react adversely to violence in the form of terrorism and wars. Worldwide panel growth estimates present an average picture that will not reflect Africa's growth response to terrorism if Africa reacts differently than other regions. Moreover, an
African dummy variable in a worldwide panel study does not quantify how Africa responds to each of the determinants of growth, including the diverse forms of terrorism and conflicts.
In an earlier study, Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides (2004) showed that African growth, indeed, reacted differently than other regions and the world at large to transnational terrorism and other growth determinants. For example, Africa displayed the smallest response to investment shares. These authors also found that Africa had a much larger growth reaction to terrorism than the global or other regional samples. This large response for Africa seems out of character for their 1968-2000 sample period, because Africa had relatively little terrorism compared with other regions that showed less of a growth response to transnational terrorism (see Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides, 2004, Tables 4 and 5) . Africa has been plagued by terrorism and internal conflicts over the last few decades; thus, it is of interest to discern the economic ramifications of these hostile influences. Another justification for our African focus is that many transnational terrorist groups that sought bases in Africa. Thus, the inclusion of post-9/11 years is particularly attractive for our study. Africa is an important source of strategic resources including oil. Given recent discoveries of rich offshore oil reserves in West Africa, Africa's oilsupplier status will grow (Lyman & Morrison, 2004) . Consequently, terrorist attacks in Africa have the potential to disrupt crucial supply lines to the industrial world. Our study assesses how sensitive African economies are to terrorist-induced economic stress. A final ground for focusing on Africa is that it contains many developing countries that receive foreign aid (Hoeffler, 2002) . Such countries' economies are particularly sensitive to the harmful influence of terrorism (Keefer & Loayza, 2008 given in the fourth section, followed by concluding remarks in the final section.
Preliminaries
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence against noncombatants by subnational groups or individuals in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. Thus, bombings and armed attacks are intended by terrorists to raise the anxiety level of citizens (i.e., the audience), so that they pressure their government to grant the terrorists' demands. This definition rules out state terrorism but not state-sponsored terrorism, where a government clandestinely aids a terrorist group through intelligence, funding, training, safe havens, or other means (Mickolus, 1989 Transnational terrorist incidents have ramifications that extend beyond the venue country.
Terrorist events that start in one country and concludes in another (e.g., a skyjacking of a plane in Egypt that is made to fly to Algeria) are transnational terrorist attacks. If the victims or perpetrators in a terrorist incident are from countries other than the host or venue country, then the terrorist attack is transnational. The Luxor massacre in November 1997 involved foreign nationals from Japan, Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and elsewhere; thus, this armed attack is a transnational terrorist incident.
As indicated earlier, income per capita growth can also be influenced by internal and external conflicts. We use data on these conflicts drawn from a dataset, Major Episodes of 1946 -2008 , maintained by Marshall (2009 We next turn to two essential neoclassical determinants of income per capita growth (growth). The initial level of income per capita (y) is typically viewed as a positive influence on growth owing to the notion of convergence, in which the rise in income per capita of a poorer country outpaces that of a richer country (Barro, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992 ).
Diminishing returns is behind convergence, in which countries have an easier time in adding output where there are less initial inputs and output. Countries are assumed to possess identical production functions and transition equations, but differ in their starting income per capita. This latter assumption is more appropriate for a cohort of countries at similar stages of development where production technologies are similar. This is more likely to hold for our African sample than for a diverse global sample. A second key neoclassical influence on growth is investment share (I/GDP). Larger investment shares result in greater capital accumulation, which fosters growth through capital and embodied technological change.
At a later point, we also introduce some macroeconomic variables that may affect growth. Often, openness -the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP -is viewed as a positive determinant on growth (Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides, 2004) . Openness may foster growth as greater exports increase aggregate demand and more imports enhance resources and technology transfers, particularly in the case of developing countries.
Political violence in various forms are anticipated to limit income per capita growth (Barro, 1991; Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides, 2004; Murdoch and Sandler, 2002b, 2004) . In the introduction, we indicated numerous grounds why transnational and domestic terrorism are anticipated to reduce growth. There are grounds for anticipating that transnational terrorism will be more detrimental than domestic terrorism on growth. When a terrorist event kills a foreigner or destroys foreign property, there is a greater chance that this will negatively impact foreign assistance and/or foreign direct investment (a key source of savings), which then reduces growth.
Terrorists deliberately target foreign assets to affect the venue country's economy adversely.
Often, foreign targets include those of donor and investor nations. Attacks against foreign tourists may have particularly large economic impacts (Enders, Sandler & Parise, 1992 Murdoch & Sandler (2002b , 2004 , and others have shown that internal and external conflicts resulted in reduced income per capita growth.
These conflicts harmed growth by diverting funds to security spending, raising uncertainty, increasing diseases, reducing trade, eliminating human capital, and causing capital flight. For Asia, Gaibulloev & Sandler (2009) established that internal and external conflicts had a much greater harmful impact on growth then transnational terrorism. Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides (2004) also uncovered that conflicts decreased growth more than transnational terrorism for their worldwide sample.
Methodology

Empirical specifications
The baseline model is a modification of the neoclassical growth model with the addition of terrorism and conflict variables: 
where subscript i = 1, …, N indicates the country and subscript t = 1, …, T indexes the time period. The convergence term in county i is captured by the natural logarithm of lagged income per capita, 1 ln it y − . Initially, the explanatory variable terror is the number of terrorist attacks per million persons; alternative measures for terror are introduced later. The internal and external terms are dummy variables for internal and external conflicts, respectively. The βs are regression coefficients; i α is the country-specific fixed effect; t η is the time-specific effect; and it ε is the random error term.
Our empirical strategy consists of the following steps. First, we implement the fixedeffects estimator on the baseline model, Equation (1) (Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides, 2004; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009 ). We examine alternative measures for robustness check. [ Figure 1 near here]
More detailed information on terrorist events by country and by African regions is reported in Table IIA in the Appendix. For example, based on the total number of transnational terrorist incidents over the sample period, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, and Somalia are among the top five countries, based on ITERATE and GTD data. In terms of domestic terrorist events, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Egypt, and South Africa are the most terrorism-plagued countries in Africa ( Table IIA) .
Given that ITERATE uses a consistent coding approach, Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2010) devised a calibration procedure for the GTD data. In short, these authors first calibrated transnational terrorist events in GTD using these consistently coded events in ITERATE. The calibration was based on a ratio of means. Next, they calibrated GTD's domestic terrorist incidents by the same ratios of means for the requisite periods. For the world sample, they inflated the number of pre-1977:2 GTD incidents (domestic and transnational) by a factor of 2.06
and deflated the number of GTD incidents for 1991:2-1997:4 by a scaling factor of 0.52. (The numbers after the colon denote quarters.) However, we cannot use these scaling factors and periods for Africa, because Figure 1 indicates that the terrorism data for the Africa sample behave differently than the data for the world sample. Following the approach suggested by Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2010) , we calibrate GTD data using scale factors specific to
Africa. In particular, we scale up the number of GTD incidents prior to 1980 by a factor of 2.80 (= 15/5.4), the ratio of the mean number of ITERATE incidents to the mean number of GTD transnational incidents for this period. Similarly, we inflate the number of GTD incidents for 1981-1988 by a scale factor of 2.52; for 1990 by a scale factor of 1.67; and for 1999-2000 by a scale factor of 2.63. We use these scaling factors to modify GTD domestic incidents as well.
[ Figure 2 near here] 
Information on conflicts is obtained from Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV)
database (Marshall, 2009 (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009 ). The variable reflects three key inter-related elements:
opportunities for political participation, constraints on executive power, and government support and protection of civil liberties. This index ranges between -10 (strongly autocratic) and +10
(strongly democratic).
The main source of information for gross domestic product (GDP) is World Bank (2009). 5 We obtain GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) in current international dollars for 2000 and extend the series forwards and backwards using the real growth rate of GDP per capita in local currency units (LCU 
Estimation and results
The fixed-effects estimates of our baseline model are presented in transnational terrorism is about -0.01 using ITERATE and -0.02 using GTD, which means that, on average, an extra transnational terrorist incident per million persons reduces economic growth by about 1 to 2% in a given year. 6 At first, these growth effects seem large if one considers the small and, sometimes, negative annual growth rate of African economies during the study period.
The impacts are, however, in terms of per million persons: a country with a population of 50 million would have to experience 50 transnational terrorist incidents in a given year to have its income per capita growth rate decline by 1%. For our sample countries, the average annual number of transnational terrorist events per million persons is about 0.1. Thus, on average, the negative marginal impact of transnational terrorism in our African sample is about 0.1 percentage point of income per capita growth, which is small and consistent with, but somewhat larger than, that of the literature (Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides, 2004; Tavares, 2004) . The coefficients of internal and external conflicts are about -0.02, indicating that a conflict reduces income per capita growth by approximately 2% in a year.
[ Table II near here] There are a number of possible or additional determinants of economic growth, discussed in literature. For example, Artadi & Sala-i-Martin (2003) showed that, among the other factors, the degree of economic openness, government spending, and political and economic institutions are important determinants of economic growth in Africa. We investigate the robustness of the above terrorism results by including a host of additional macroeconomic and political variables to the growth model in Table II . The CD test statistics suggest the presence of cross-sectional dependence, which we take into account by estimating Driscoll and Kraay's standard errors. As seen in Table II, The results in Table II Based on the cluster-robust standard errors, most of the results of Table II hold, except that the ITERATE transnational terrorism and external conflict variables are not significant.
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[ Table III near here]
Next, we implement a number of additional robustness checks -see Table III . To save space, we only report estimates of the terrorism variables. As discussed in the previous section, our findings are based on calibrated GTD data. First, we check our results by re-estimating the models of Table II Second, there is no satisfactory answer as how to measure terrorism, given available data. We re-estimate our models using two alternative measures of terrorism from the literature: number of terrorist incidents (not normalized by population) and a dummy variable for terrorism (i.e., whether or not there was terrorism in a given year for a country). For both cases, our results generally hold in terms of sign and statistical significance. The only notable difference is that domestic terrorism is significant in Model 3 when we apply a dummy. Finally, we use one-year lagged value of the number of terrorist incidents per million persons. The estimate of ITERATE transnational terrorist incidents is not significant, while the estimate of GTD transnational terrorist incidents remains negative and statistically significant.
Concluding remarks
Both terrorism and conflict (internal and external) adversely affect income per capita growth in Africa. Past studies have shown that Africa responds differently than the rest of the world to growth factors (Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides, 2004) ; hence, there are grounds for our analysis to quantify these differences for an up-to-date sample that accounts for terrorism and other growth factors in Africa. By distinguishing between the two types of terrorism, we show that only transnational terrorism has a significant negative influence on growth in Africa for our panel estimates. Domestic terrorism does not have a significant adverse impact on African growth. Our results are robust not only to the inclusion of other economic and political variables (e.g., government spending share, trade openness, democracy index, and population growth), but also to alternative specifications of the terrorism variable.
Because Africa contains so many developing countries and weak democracies, insights from the literature suggest that African growth may be especially hard hit by terrorism (see, e.g., Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009; Keefer & Loayza, 2008) . This worry is compounded by the increasing presence of fundamentalist terrorists in Africa (Lyman & Morrison, 2004 ) and the transference of terrorist attacks to Africa over the last decade or so .
Though the effect of terrorism on growth is significant, it is surprisingly modest when one considers the average population levels. This is an important consideration because our primary terrorism variable is the number of incidents per million persons. Most sample countries have relatively few terrorist incidents per year and large populations. The average annual number of transnational terrorist incidents per million persons is approximately just 0.1 for our sample.
Hence, an average sample country sustains a very small annual reduction in its income per capita growth of 0.1%, because it must experience an additional incident per million persons for growth to fall by 1% or 2% in the case of transnational terrorism. This is encouraging news. The absence of a significant domestic terrorism impact on African growth is also good news insofar as Africa is plagued by much more domestic than transnational terrorism. When trying to limit negative growth effects of terrorism, this study shows that counterterrorism resources should be directed to transnational, rather than domestic, terrorism.
The transference of transnational terrorist attacks to Africa in recent years is largely due to enhanced border security in the United States, Europe, and other wealthy countries. Often, US, Israel, and European assets are targeted in Africa-based transnational terrorist attacks . Thus, these rich countries have an obligation to help African countries bolster their counterterrorism responses if asked. Since the same terrorist groups -e.g., al-Qaida -may target more than one African country, there is a need for a coordinated African response in such instances.
When judging the effectiveness of their aid for development, donor countries must take into account that terrorism will curb recipient countries' growth. This reduced performance should not always be attributed to other nefarious causes such as corruption or bad policies. The results of this paper allow for a calculation of these generally modest growth losses.
UNSD is about 0.9. The correlation between GDP per capita (PPP) from World Bank and IMF is above 0.9, while this correlation is about 0.64 for Penn World Table and World Bank data.
6. Gaibulloev & Sandler (2008) found that the effect of transnational terrorist events on growth is larger than that of aggregate terrorist events for Western Europe. In addition, they
showed that the influence of transnational terrorism on income per capita growth is greater than that of domestic terrorism.
7. These results are available from the authors upon request. Pesaran's (2004) test of cross-sectional independence and p-value is the probability value of the null. Constant and time dummies are suppressed. Driscoll and Kraay's standard errors are in parentheses. These standard errors are robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional (spatial) dependence. R-squared (within) is computed after removing country effects. Significance levels: *** is .01, ** is .05, and * is .10. Table II for specification. Driscoll and Kraay's standard errors are in parentheses. These standard errors are robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional (spatial) dependence. Significance levels: *** is .01, ** is .05, and * is .10.
